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1 Introduction
The transportation sector is responsible for over a quarter of U.S. greenhouse gas emissions, the majority
of which result from fossil fuel combustion. Politicians and regulatory agencies in the U.S. have passed
or considered a suite of policies to decrease emissions in the sector, including carbon taxes, fuel economy
standards, renewable fuel mandates, and regional or federal emissions trading programs. If unpriced emissions
are the sole market failure, a carbon tax or emissions trading program can achieve the first-best market
allocation (Pigou, 1920; Coase, 1960), while renewable fuel mandates are strictly second-best (Helfand, 1992;
Holland et al., 2009; Lapan and Moschini, 2012). Despite this, policymakers typically favor renewable fuel
mandates to reduce transportation fuel emissions.1
The most prominent fuel mandates in the U.S. currently are the federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS),
a renewable fuel share mandate; and California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS), a carbon intensity
standard. To comply with renewable fuel mandates, both upstream firms and downstream consumers must
invest in new technologies. For example, the RFS requires 36 billion gallons (bgals) of ethanol to be blended
into the U.S. fuel supply each year by 2022, of which 16 billion gallons must be biofuel derived from cellulosic
feedstocks. Meeting these targets will require tremendous investments in the research and development,
commercialization, and production of cellulosic biofuels. In addition, consumers must purchase millions of
vehicles capable of using high-ethanol blend fuels.
Delays in the development and deployment of new technologies when binding mandates exist for their
use may lead to situations with high short-run compliance costs. The problem compounds if compliance
credits are bankable, in which case the anticipation of high future compliance costs may lead to significant
increases in credit prices in the present. This situation has already borne out under the RFS. In 2013, the
fuel industry anticipated that the statutory mandates would become increasingly difficult to meet beyond
2014. This caused RFS compliance credit prices to increase from $0.10/gal to $1.40/gal over the course of
only a few months. The large and sudden increase in compliance costs set off a prolonged period of regulatory
uncertainty and delay as the EPA considered how to best address these challenges, and eventually led to the
Agency relaxing the mandates (Lade et al., 2017).
In this paper, we study the market effects of and efficiency gains from including cost containment mech-
anisms in renewable fuel mandates. To this end, we formalize, expand upon, and synthesize the previous
literature studying renewable fuel mandates by developing a model of mandates under perfect competition
that incorporates both a renewable share mandate and a carbon intensity standard, both with and without
a cost containment mechanism. The extant literature has traditionally considered cost containment mech-
anisms as tools for increasing program efficiency and decreasing compliance cost uncertainty (Newell et al.,
1An exception is California’s cap and trade program. Since 2015, refiners in California have held an obligation for emissions
from the combustion of all fossil fuels sold in the state. The most aggressive policy aimed at reducing transportation fuel
emissions in the state, however, remains the Low Carbon Fuel Standard, a carbon intensity standard.
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2005; Nemet, 2010; Fell et al., 2012; Fell, 2016). In contrast, we show that cost containment mechanisms
may substantially increase the efficiency of a policy even in settings with no uncertainty. In particular, we
show that whenever the marginal cost of renewable fuels is high relative to fossil fuels, cost containment
mechanisms have the benefit of both constraining compliance costs and limiting deadweight loss. If both
the mandate and cost containment mechanism are set optimally, the efficiency of the policy increases sub-
stantially over optimally setting the fuel mandates alone. In a limiting case, an LCFS with an optimal cost
containment mechanism can achieve the first-best outcome. Using a numerical model of the U.S. gasoline
market, we show that the efficiency gains from strategically including a credit window offering with a fuel
mandate are economically significant.
This work builds on an extensive literature studying fuel mandates, environmental policy design, and cost
containment mechanisms. A number of authors have studied the market effects of carbon intensity standards
and renewable fuel mandates (de Gorter and Just, 2009; Holland et al., 2009; Lapan and Moschini, 2012).
Others have built on this work, comparing the relative performance of fuel mandates to more traditional
policy instruments such as carbon taxes (Holland et al., 2013, 2014; Chen et al., 2014); studying unintended
consequences of the policies and their relative efficiency when markets are imperfectly competitive (Holland,
2012) or open to trade (Rajagopal et al., 2011); and examining ways policymakers can increase the efficiency
fuel mandates through strategic policy choices (Lemoine, 2016).2
Our work also builds on the literature studying the effects and efficiency of hybrid price-quantity policies.
Roberts and Spence (1976) first proposed pairing a fixed non-compliance penalty and abatement subsidy
with a tradeable credit policy to bound compliance costs and reduce the expected social cost of a policy when
costs and benefits are uncertain. A large literature has subsequently studied similar proposals, primarily in
the context of emission trading programs (e.g., Pizer (2002); Newell et al. (2005); Burtraw et al. (2010); Fell
and Morgenstern (2010)). In addition, it has been shown in the previous literature that a rate-based standard
can achieve the first-best if it is coupled with an emissions tax (Holland et al., 2009) or a consumption tax
(Holland, 2012); we build on this work by analyzing if one can improve the efficiency of renewable fuel
mandates, including volumetric standards, by coupling the mandate with a cost containment mechanism.
Renewable energy mandates for new technologies exist in contexts other than the transportation fuel
sector as well. Many states have ambitious renewable portfolio standards that require significant investments
in renewable electricity generation. Thus, to the extent that similar capacity constraints exist in these
contexts, the findings here have implications for the efficient design of renewable energy policies more broadly.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.1 provides a brief background on the Renewable Fuel Standard
and the Low Carbon Fuel Standard, and discusses cost containment provisions that have either been con-
sidered or implemented under each policy. Section 3 presents a model of a regulated fuel industry, analyzes
2In addition, because the feedstocks used for the production of corn-based ethanol can also be used for food, there is a
related literature on the effects of ethanol policies on the relationship between food and fuel markets (Runge and Senauer, 2007;
Rajagopal et al., 2007; Wright, 2014; Poudel et al., 2012; Abbott et al., 2008, 2009, 2011; de Gorter et al., 2013).
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the effects of renewable fuel mandates and a cost containment mechanism on important market outcomes,
and derives the second-best policies with and without cost containment. Section 4 presents our numerical
model, expanding upon the model in Section 3 along several important dimensions. Section 5 concludes.
2 Renewable Fuel Mandates
We begin by discussing the regulatory background for both the Renewable Fuel Standard and various Low
Carbon Fuel Standards. We also discuss important design elements of each policy, focusing on the use
and importance of tradeable compliance credits. We then discuss a number of important implementation
challenges facing each policy.
2.1 Regulatory Background and Design
The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) was created by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 and expanded under
the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, creating the RFS2. The policy is administered by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and sets ambitious targets for renewable fuel consumption in the
U.S., with the goal of expanding biofuel use to 36 billion gallons (bgal) per year by 2022, approximately a
25% biofuel-blending mandate. The RFS2 specifies sub-mandates for certain biofuels including: (1) cellulosic
biofuel; (2) biomass-based diesel; and (3) advanced biofuel.3 For example, the 2016 mandates require that
18.11 bgals of biofuel be blended into the U.S. fuel supply, of which 3.61 bgals must be advanced biofuel. Of
the advanced biofuel mandate, 1.9 bgals must be biodiesel and 230 mgals must be cellulosic biofuel.
Executive Order S-01-07 created California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) in 2007, and the policy
has been in effect since 2011. The standard is administered by the California Air Resources Board (ARB) and
requires a 10% reduction in the average carbon intensity of fuels sold in the state by 2020. Unlike the RFS,
the LCFS is agnostic as to the fuels that can be used to meet the standard so long as the ARB approves all
production pathways and assigns fuels a carbon intensity (CI) value.4 For example, providers of electricity for
plug-in vehicles and hydrogen fuel producers may generate credits under the LCFS (California ARB, 2015).
While California’s LCFS is the largest intensity standard for transportation fuels, British Columbia and
Oregon have similar policies in place, and Washington and the European Union have proposed instituting
low carbon fuel standards (British Columbia Ministry of Energy and Mines, 2014; Oregon Department of
Environmental Quality, 2016; Pont et al., 2014; European Commission, 2014).
3Cellulosic biofuels are fuels produced from non-edible biomass such as corn stover or switchgrass. Biomass-based diesel is
produced mostly from animal fats or vegetable oils such as soybean oil. Biofuels qualify as ‘advanced’ if their lifecycle greenhouse
gas production emissions are below a threshold set by the EPA.
4Carbon intensity (CI) values represent the ARB’s estimate of the carbon equivalent emissions rate of a given fuel’s life-cycle
production process.
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Both the RFS and LCFS are enforced using tradeable compliance credits. Obligated parties, primarily
upstream gasoline and diesel refiners, generate deficits in proportion to their fuel sales while qualifying
renewable fuel producers generate credits. To maintain compliance, obligated parties must account for their
deficits by purchasing or generating an equal number of credits by the end of each compliance period.
Under the RFS, compliance credits are known as Renewable Identification Numbers (RINs). Every
gallon of approved renewable fuel produced in or imported into the United States from a registered source
is associated with a RIN. Whenever a gallon of renewable fuel is blended into the U.S. fuel supply, the RIN
is ‘detached’ from the fuel and able to be sold to obligated parties. RINs are differentiated by vintage year
and fuel type to enforce banking restrictions and ensure the mandate for each biofuel category is met.
LCFS credits and deficits are denominated in tons CO2 equivalence (CO2e) and calculated using the
spread between the fuels’ assigned carbon intensity (CI) value and the standard. For example, every gallon of
gasoline sold generates a deficit equal to the difference between gasoline’s CI and the standard. Analogously,
every gallon of fuel produced that has a lower CI than the standard generates a credit surplus equal to the
difference between the standard and its CI. Thus, credits (deficits) are generated only for the amount of
emissions below (in excess of) the standard. Obligated parties maintain compliance by purchasing credits
from low-carbon fuel producers, producing or blending renewable fuels themselves, or lowering the carbon
intensity of their fuel by changing their production pathways.
2.2 Implementation challenges and cost containment mechanisms
The future success of both policies faces a number of challenges. The two most notable issues are: (1) the
‘blend wall’; and (2) the slow development of commercial scale low-carbon fuel production.
The blend wall refers to the notion that blending ethanol beyond a 10% rate in gasoline is costly. Ethanol
has historically been blended at two levels: E10, fuel containing 10% ethanol; and E85, fuel containing 65%-
85% ethanol. Vehicle owners must own flex-fuel vehicles (FFVs) to fuel with E85, and gasoline station owners
must invest in fueling infrastructure to offer the fuel. While many FFVs have been produced in the U.S.,
they are not located in regions with the highest density of E85 stations due to unintended consequences from
incentives for FFVs under U.S. fuel economy standards (Anderson and Sallee, 2011; Pouliot and Babcock,
2014). Increasing biofuel consumption beyond the blend wall in the near term requires either expanding E85
use or increasing biodiesel consumption where blending constraints are less binding. Both options are costly
due to a combination of high production costs and binding capacity constraints.
Before 2013, the primary biofuel used to for compliance towards both the RFS and LCFS was ethanol
derived from corn (Environmental Protection Agency, 2013a; Yeh et al., 2013). However, the success of both
the RFS2 and LCFS in coming years depends crucially on the development of advanced alternative fuels
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such as cellulosic biofuel. As of early 2015, cellulosic production was far below the original RFS2 mandates
(Energy Information Agency, 2012b). In addition, Yeh et al. (2013) found that California’s fuel mix in 2013
would only allow the industry to maintain compliance with the LCFS through the end of 2013 and that
meeting future LCFS targets would become increasingly difficult without a significant expansion in the use
of advanced, low-carbon fuels.5
Given these challenges, both the EPA and the California ARB have considered or enacted various cost
containment provisions. For example, from 2010-2011 the EPA allowed parties to purchase cellulosic RIN
credits through an open credit window instead of blending cellulosic fuel. In addition, in November 2013,
the EPA proposed a substantial rollback of the RFS mandates for 2014 and beyond in response to high
RIN prices (Environmental Protection Agency, 2013b). In California, the Air Resources Board released a
white paper in May 2013 discussing mechanisms to contain compliance costs including establishing a credit
window or a low carbon credit multiplier (California ARB, 2014).6 In March 2014, the Board began a
re-adoption process of the policy, and one of the key provisions under consideration was the inclusion of a
cost containment mechanism (California ARB, 2013).
3 Model
To present the intuition for why cost containment mechanisms can increase the efficiency of renewable fuel
mandates, we develop a model of a mandate with no uncertainty, a single compliance period, and a single
biofuel mandate. Consider a competitive industry that produces fuel of total quantity Q. Assume the
industry uses two inputs: (1) a conventional input, qc; and (2) a renewable input, qr.7 Assume the inputs
are denominated in such a way that they are perfect substitutes with Q = qc+qr. For example, if consumers
value the energy content of fuel, the units could be denominated in gasoline gallon equivalent (GGE) units.8
Suppose each input is associated with an emission factor φj for j = c, r. The damages from aggregate
emissions are captured by the damage function D(φcqc + φrqr), where the marginal damage D′(·) from a
5Before the LCFS reached this critical level, several court rulings led to the LCFS being frozen at 1.5% while the California
ARB re-adopted the policy (California ARB, 2013). The court order was subsequently lifted in 2015, and the ARB re-adopted
the policy with a new compliance schedule.
6Lade and Lin (2013) compare the effectiveness of each of the ARB’s proposals in constraining compliance costs under the
LCFS. A low carbon credit multiplier acts in a similar manner as simply relaxing the policy constraint, and is therefore not
considered here.
7The assumption of two inputs is made for notational ease. While the qualitative results are not affected in the multi-fuel
case (Lade and Lin, 2013), not all the analytic results presented in this section generalize to the multi-fuel case. We examine
the multi-fuel case in our numerical model in Section 4.
8Denominating in gasoline gallon equivalent (GGE) units may be needed if consumers value the energy content of fuel, since
a gallon of renewable fuel typically does not contain as much energy as a gallon of gasoline or diesel. A gallon of ethanol has
around 70% of the energy content of a gallon of gasoline, while a gallon of biomass-based diesel has around 95% of the energy
content of conventional diesel.
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unit of emissions is the same for the two fuels. We write the biofuel mandate as ϕ(qc, qr; θ) in order to
accommodate both a renewable fuel share mandate and a carbon intensity standard.
We begin by studying the effects of each fuel mandate on important market outcomes. We then examine
the market effects of a cost containment mechanism that caps compliance costs. In particular, we consider a
scenario in which the regulator offers a credit window from which firms can purchase compliance credits at a
fixed cost. Last, we consider the second-best levels of the fuel mandates and cost containment mechanisms.
3.1 Market effects of fuel mandates
We study two mandates: (1) a renewable share mandate similar to the RFS;9 and (2) an energy-based carbon
intensity standard similar to California’s LCFS. We model market equilibrium using a representative firm.
Suppose consumers have decreasing, weakly concave inverse demand for fuel given by P (Q). In addition,
assume the fuel industry has increasing, convex production costs Cc(qc) and Cr(qr) for conventional and
renewable fuel, respectively.
An RFS requires the share of renewable fuel to be greater than a specified volume obligation. We write
the constraint as qr ≥ αqc, where α is renewable share mandate set by the regulator. We specify the LCFS
as an energy-based carbon intensity standard, writing the policy constraint as φ
cqc+φrqr
qc+qr ≤ σ, where σ is the
low carbon fuel standard. For notational ease, we rewrite both mandates as ϕ(qc, qr; θ) ≥ 0 as:
[RFS:] ϕ(qc, qr; θ) = qr − αqc ≥ 0
[LCFS:] ϕ(qc, qr; θ) = (σ − φc)qc + (σ − φr)qr ≥ 0,
where θ are the policy parameters with θ = α under the RFS and θ = σ under the LCFS.
Under a renewable fuel mandate, the representative firm’s problem can be written as:
max
qc≥0;qr≥0
P (qc + qr)− Cc(qc)− Cr(qr) + λ [ϕ(qc, qr; θ)] ,
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier on the mandate constraint, with λ ≥ 0 if the policy binds. The Karush-
Kuhn-Tucker optimality conditions are:
[qc :] P − ∂Cc∂qc + λ∂ϕ(·)∂qc ≤ 0 (1)
[qr :] P − ∂Cr∂qr + λ∂ϕ(·)∂qr ≤ 0 (2)
λ[ϕ(qc, qr; θ)] = 0.
Conditions (1) and (2) hold with equality for interior solutions, and the third condition states that either
the policy binds with equality or the constraint is slack and λ = 0. For the RFS, the partial derivatives of
9Given our assumption of a single renewable fuel, we do not model the RFS using a nested mandate structure. Thus, our
model is most applicable to the overall biofuel mandate under the RFS.
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the policy function are given by ∂ϕ(·)∂qc = −α < 0 and ∂ϕ(·)∂qr = 1 > 0. For the LCFS, the partial derivatives of
the policy function are given by ∂ϕ(·)∂qc = (σ − φc) < 0 and ∂ϕ(·)∂qr = (σ − φr) > 0.
When the market for compliance credits is competitive, the representative firm’s Lagrange multiplier λ is
the equilibrium compliance credit price.10 The equilibrium compliance credit price λ can be used to construct
direct measures of the policies’ costs. To see this, note that the value function for the representative firm is
given by:
V (qc∗, qr∗) = P (qc∗ + qr∗)− Cc(qc∗)− Cr(qr∗) + λ [ϕ(qc∗, qr∗, θ)] .
The Envelope Theorem implies that the marginal value to the representative firm of increasing each mandate
is ∂V (q
c,qr)
∂α = −λqc for the RFS and ∂V (q
c,qr)
∂σ = λQ for the LCFS. The difference in signs is due to the
different interpretation of each policy variable. For the RFS, as α increases, the mandated share of renewable
fuel increases and the policy becomes more stringent. For the LCFS, as σ increases, the average carbon
intensity requirement on fuels increases and the policy becomes less stringent.
Equations (1) and (2) summarize the previous research studying the two mandates (de Gorter and Just,
2009; Holland et al., 2009; Lapan and Moschini, 2012). The conditions state that the mandates implicitly
tax conventional fuels and subsidize renewable fuels. The implicit tax on conventional fuel is −λ∂ϕ(·)∂qc and
the implicit subsidy for renewable fuel is λ∂ϕ(·)∂qr . The level of the tax and subsidy is endogenous, where the
compliance credit price λ adjusts to the point where the mandate is just met whenever the policy binds.
The compliance credit price under either policy is driven by the differences in marginal cost between the
renewable and conventional fuel. To see this, combine the two optimality conditions (1) and (2) for each
mandate to yield:
[RFS:] λ =
∂Cr
∂qr − ∂C
c
∂qc
1+α
[LCFS:] λ =
∂Cr
∂qr − ∂C
c
∂qc
φc−φr .
The conditions state that λ equals the weighted difference between the renewable and conventional fuel
marginal costs. Thus, all else equal a high spread between marginal costs of renewable and conventional
fuels will lead to high compliance costs under either policy.
Equilibrium fuel prices under each mandate equal a weighted average of the marginal costs of each fuel,
where the weights correspond to the share requirement under each respective mandate. To see this, substitute
each solution for λ above into either equation (1) or (2) to obtain:
[RFS:] P = 11+α
∂Cc
∂qc +
α
1+α
∂Cr
∂qr
[LCFS:] P = σ−φ
r
φc−φr
∂Cc
∂qc +
φc−σ
φc−φr
∂Cr
∂qr .
10The proof follows Montgomery (1972), showing that when firms can trade compliance credits, have perfect information,
and face no trading costs marginal compliance costs are equalized to λ across all firms.
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The equations illustrate the similarity of the two fuel mandates.11 The distinguishing factor between the
policies is how the share mandate is constructed. The RFS share mandate is explicitly set by α, while the
LCFS share mandate is implicitly determined by the fuels’ relative carbon intensity factors.
Proposition 1 summarizes important comparative statics with respect to the policy parameters under a
binding fuel mandate.12
Proposition 1: Market effects of fuel mandates
i Under both mandates, increasing the stringency of the policy reduces production of the conventional
fuel qc.
ii Under an RFS, increasing α increases production of renewable fuel qr if 1ξc − 1ηd > α λP , where ξc is
the price elasticity of supply for the conventional input and ηd is the elasticity of demand.13 Under
an LCFS, decreasing σ increases production of renewable fuel qr if 1ξc − 1ηd > (φc − σ) λP .
Increasing the stringency of both policies decreases qc and increases qr so long as 1ξc − 1ηd is larger than
a term proportional to the ratio of the compliance credit price and the fuel price, λP . Thus, if the supply of
conventional fuel or the demand for fuel are relatively inelastic, increasing the stringency of either policy will
increase qr. Intuitively, if consumers do not decrease consumption or conventional suppliers do not reduce
their supply as the policies become more stringent, the only means to maintain compliance is to increase
the supply of renewable fuel. If, however, consumers reduce fuel consumption or fossil fuel producers reduce
production in response to increases in the stringency of the policies, qr does not necessarily need to increase
to maintain compliance. The effect of the mandates on fuel prices depends on total fuel supply response. It
can be shown that a necessary condition for the policy to increase fuel price P is ξc > ξr, i.e., fuel prices
increase as the policies become more stringent if the supply elasticity of the conventional fuel is greater than
the renewable supply elasticity.14
Figure 1 illustrates the effects of both policies. The left figure graphs the no policy equilibrium, and
the right figure graphs equilibrium under a fuel mandate. In both graphs, the downward sloping line is the
fuel demand curve; the upward sloping line with triangles is the conventional fuel supply curve; the upward
sloping line with circles is the renewable fuel supply curve; and the bold upward sloping line is the total fuel
supply curve, equal to the horizontal sum of the renewable and conventional supply curves.
In the left figure, the total and conventional fuel supply curves are the same until the price reaches the
intercept of the renewable fuel supply curve. The initial market clearing price P0 and total fuel quantity Q0
are found where the total fuel supply curve intersects the demand curve. The supply of conventional and
renewable fuel, qc0 and q
r
0, respectively, is given by the corresponding quantity where the equilibrium price
intersects the individual supply functions.
11Moreover, for the special case when α = −(σ − φc)/(σ − φr), the policy functions ϕ(qc, qr; θ) for both the RFS and the
LCFS are identical.
12All proofs are presented in Appendix A.
13Note that ξc and ηd represent local elasticities.
14Fischer (2010) derives analogous results for the effect of Renewable Portfolio Standards on wholesale electricity prices.
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Figure 1: Market Effects of Fuel Mandates*
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Notes: The left figure illustrates the no policy equilibrium, and the right graphs the equilibrium under a fuel mandate. The
downward sloping line is the fuel demand curve, the upward sloping line with triangles is the conventional fuel supply curve,
the upward sloping line with circles is the renewable fuel supply curve, and the bold upward sloping line is the total fuel supply
curve.
The right graph illustrates equilibrium under a binding fuel mandate, with the solid lines representing the
initial supply curves and the dashed lines representing the supply curves net of the fuel mandate’s implicit
subsidy and tax. Under both policies, the renewable supply curve shifts down and the conventional supply
curve shifts up until the market clearing price and quantities are such that the equilibrium quantities comply
with the mandate. The equilibrium price PM and quantity QM are found where the new dashed total
fuel supply curve, equal to the sum of the shifted conventional and renewable supply curves, intersects the
demand curve. In our example, the resulting equilibrium results in greater production of renewable fuel qrM
and a lower production of conventional fuel qcM . Because total fuel consumption QM declines, the policy
results in higher fuel prices PM over the no policy equilibrium.
3.2 Cost containment
Now suppose the regulator wishes to limit compliance costs. We model the cost containment mechanism as
the regulator offering a credit window for compliance credits. Let c > 0 denote the number of credits bought
9
from the regulator through the window and p¯cred be the credit window price. The new policy constraints
are:
[RFS:] ϕ(qc, qr, c; θ) = qr + c− αqc ≥ 0
[LCFS:] ϕ(qc, qr, c; θ) = (σ − φc)qc + (σ − φr)qr + c ≥ 0.
The representative firm’s problem is:
L = max
qc,qr,c≥0
P (qc + qr)− Cc(qc)− Cr(qr)− p¯credc+ λ [ϕi(qc, qr, c; θ)] ,
with corresponding Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions:
[qc :] P − ∂Cc∂qc + λ∂ϕ(·)∂qc ≤ 0 (3)
[qr :] P − ∂Cr∂qr + λ∂ϕ(·)∂qr ≤ 0 (4)
[c :] λ− p¯cred ≤ 0 (5)
λ[ϕ(qc, qr; θ)] = 0.
The conditions state that when a regulator offers a credit window, if marginal compliance costs are below
the credit price, firms will not purchase credits from the window and marginal compliance costs will be
determined as before. If marginal compliance costs reach or exceed the credit price, firms will purchase from
the window and compliance credit prices will equal p¯cred. Hence, the open credit window creates a ceiling
on marginal compliance costs. Proposition 2 summarizes the comparative statics with respect to the credit
price p¯cred when firms purchase from the credit window.
Proposition 2: Suppose firms purchase from the credit window such that λ = p¯cred. Under both fuel
mandates as the emergency credit price p¯cred increases:
i The volume qc of conventional fuel decreases and the volume qr of renewable fuel increases; and
ii The quantity c of compliance credits decreases
3.3 Second-best policies
Now consider the second-best fuel mandates with and without a cost containment mechanism. Whenever
unpriced emissions are the sole market failure, fuel mandates are unable to replicate the first-best solution
(Helfand, 1992; Holland et al., 2009; Lapan and Moschini, 2012).15 Despite the inefficiency of fuel mandates,
a regulator may seek to set the fuel mandate policy optimally. The optimizing regulator’s optimal mandate
policy parameter θ choice problem can be written as:
max
θ
∫ Q
0
P (x)dx− Cc(qc)− Cr(qr)−D(φcqc + φrqr).
15A more detailed treatment of the second-best nature of fuel mandates relative to a first-best cap and trade program is
provided in Appendix B.
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The first-order optimality conditions for a interior solution are given by:(
P − ∂C
c
∂qc
− φcD′(·)
)
dqc
dθ
+
(
P − ∂C
r
∂qr
− φrD′(·)
)
dqr
dθ
= 0.
For simplicity, assume a unique solution exists to the optimal fuel policy and that second-order conditions are
satisfied. Consider the optimal RFS. Substituting the firm’s optimality conditions for the RFS and making
use of Proposition 1, the optimality condition can be written as:
[αλ− φcD′(·)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
?
dqc
dα︸︷︷︸
<0
= [λ+ φrD′(·)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
dqr
dα︸︷︷︸
?
.
If dq
r
dα > 0 the condition is satisfied only if αλ < φ
cD′(·) and the opposite holds if dqrdα < 0.
Similarly, we can write the optimality condition for the LCFS as:
[(φc − σ)λ− φcD′(·)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
?
dqc
dσ︸︷︷︸
>0
= [(σ − φr)λ+ φrD′(·)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
dqr
dσ︸︷︷︸
?
.
If dq
r
dσ > 0 the condition is satisfied so long as (φ
c − σ)λ < φcD′(·), while the opposite holds if dqrdσ < 0.
The conditions state that a second-best fuel mandate should be set at a level where the implicit tax on
conventional fuel is less than its marginal damages if increasing the policy stringency increases the use of
renewable fuel. The U.S. government currently uses a social cost of carbon around $45/ton CO2 for emissions
with a 3% discount rate (IAWG, 2013). Thus, our results imply that an optimal RFS and LCFS in 2025
should be set such that the implicit tax on gasoline and diesel is less than $45/ton.
3.4 Improving the second-best through cost containment
Policymakers may want to include a cost containment mechanism in a fuel mandate several reasons. When
market outcomes are uncertain, a policy that places a ceiling on compliance costs can eliminate low prob-
ability, high compliance cost events and increase the policy’s efficiency (Newell et al., 2005; Nemet, 2010).
In this section, we show that cost containment mechanisms can increase a mandate’s efficiency even in the
absence of uncertainty.
Suppose a regulator operates in an environment where enacting a fuel mandate is preferred to instituting
a carbon price, for example due to political economy reasons. Furthermore, suppose the regulator is not able
to change the policy stringency, perhaps due to a legislative mandate, but has the ability to set the level of
a cost containment mechanism. Thus, the regulator’s problem is given by:
max
p¯cred|θ
∫ Q
0
P (x|θ)dx− Cc(qc|θ)− Cr(qr|θ)−D(φcqc + φrqr).
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The optimality condition for an interior solution are given by:(
P (Q)− ∂C
c
∂qc
− φcD′(·)
)
dqc
dp¯cred
+
(
P (Q)− ∂C
r
∂qr
− φrD′(·)
)
dqr
dp¯cred
= 0.
As before, suppose a solution exists. Substituting the firm’s optimality conditions and making use of
Proposition 2, we obtain the following conditions for the optimal credit window price, conditional on a given
policy level α or σ:
[αp¯cred − φcD′(·)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
?
dqc
dp¯cred︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
= [p¯cred + φrD′(·)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
dqr
dα︸︷︷︸
>0
.
[
(φc − σ)p¯cred − φcD′(·)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
?
dqc
dp¯cred︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
=
[
(σ − φr)p¯cred + φrD′(·)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
dqr
dp¯cred︸ ︷︷ ︸
>
.
for the RFS and LCFS, respectively. Thus, a necessary condition is for an optimum is that φcD′(·) > αp¯cred
for the RFS and φcD′(·) > (φc − σ)p¯cred for the LCFS.
The conditions illustrate that the optimal credit window price, conditional on a given policy level α or
σ, shares many of the same features as the optimal policy levels. In addition, the credit window gives the
regulator an additional tool that can be used to increase the efficiency of a fuel mandate. For example,
suppose that before enacting the mandate a policymaker believes the marginal cost of the renewable fuel
will be
∂CrL
∂qr . The anticipated market clearing credit price is λL. Knowing an efficient policy requires the
implicit tax on conventional fuels to be below marginal damages, the policymakers chooses θ optimally and(
−λL ∂ϕ(·)∂qc
)
< ∂D∂qc . Suppose, however, that ex post marginal costs are
∂CrH
∂qr >
∂CrL
∂qr . Compliance credit
prices adjust endogenously, and compliance credit prices are λH > λL. Suppose credit prices adjust such
that
(
−λH ∂ϕ(·)∂qc
)
> ∂D∂qc . Clearly, the policy is inefficient. By establishing a credit window, however, the
regulator can correct this. Assuming the initial standard was set second-best optimally given the anticipated
λL, the regulator could set p¯
cred = λL to achieve the ex-ante policy goal.
With a cost containment mechanism as an additional policy lever, a regulator may wish to optimally
choose both the mandate policy θ and the credit window price simultaneously. Inspecting the optimality
conditions under an LCFS with a credit window reveals a key feature of an LCFS. First, note that the
conditions for an interior first-best policy are:
P =
∂Ci
∂qi
+ φiD′(·)
for i = c, r. Comparing this condition with the firm’s optimality conditions (3) and (4) under a mandate
and a credit window price, no combination of the mandate α and credit window price p¯cred can replicate the
first-best optimality conditions under an RFS. Under an LCFS, however, setting the mandate to σ = 0 and
the credit window price to p¯cred = D′(·) replicates the first-best optimality conditions.
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This raises an important distinction between the RFS and the LCFS. Because the LCFS differentiates
fuels based on their carbon intensity factors, the policy can achieve more efficient outcomes than the RFS.
If the regulator sets both the policy stringency and the compliance credit price optimally, the optimal
policy calls for setting a standard equal to zero and the credit window price equal to marginal damages.
In contrast, an RFS with a credit window is never able to achieve the first-best because the policy always
implicitly subsidizes renewable fuels.16
It has been shown in the previous literature that a rate-based standard can achieve the first-best if it is
coupled with an emissions tax (Holland et al., 2009) or a consumption tax (Holland, 2012); our result that
one can achieve the first-best under an LCFS by setting the mandate to σ = 0 and the credit window price
to p¯cred = D′(·) is an extension of these previous results. We further innovate upon the previous literature
by also analyzing if one can improve the efficiency of volumetric standards such as the RFS by coupling the
mandate with cost containment mechanisms. Even though one cannot achieve the first-best under the RFS
even when combined with a credit window price, the analytic conditions we derive above for the optimal
credit window price, conditional on a given policy level, show that it is possible to improve the efficiency of
an RFS by coupling it with a credit window price. In our numerical model below, we solve for the optimal
combinations of policy level and cost containment mechanism, and analyze the efficiency gains from choosing
both the policy level and cost containment level optimally.
4 Simulation of the U.S. fuel market
We develop a numerical model of the U.S. gasoline market to better understand the relative performance and
market effects of the fuel mandates and cost containment mechanism. We assume that consumers demand
energy in GGE units and that firms produce three fuels: (1) gasoline, (2) corn ethanol, and (3) cellulosic
ethanol. We calibrate the model so that the supply of gasoline and corn ethanol and fuel prices are similar
to those in 2010. Table 1 presents the parameters used for the simulation model. All supply and demand
functions are assumed to have constant elasticity. The elasticity of demand is set to reflect recent estimates
in the literature (Hughes et al., 2012; Coyle et al., 2012), and baseline fuel prices as well as gasoline and
ethanol production are set to reflect their 2010 levels (Energy Information Agency, 2012a).
Fuel supply elasticities in the literature typically reflect either short-run or very long-run elasticities
(Dahl and Duggan, 1996; Coyle et al., 2012; Luchansky and Monks, 2009; Lee and Sumner, 2010). Most
16The same would remain true for a nested renewable share mandate structure. An example of a nested renewable share
mandate structure is the RFS2, for which cellulosic biofuel and biodiesel count toward the advanced biofuel mandate, and
all biofuels count toward the overall renewable fuel mandate. While the nested mandate levels and credit window prices may
be adjusted, yielding efficiency gains beyond using only an overall mandate, the lowest-tiered mandate will always serve as
an implicit subsidy for the lowest tiered renewable fuel, preventing the renewable share mandate policy from achieving the
first-best.
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Table 1: Numerical Simulation Parameters*
Market Parameters
Fuel Demand Elasticity 0.2
Gas Supply Elasticity 3
Corn Ethanol Supply Elasticity 3
Cellulosic Ethanol Elasticity {0.5, 3}
Marginal Damages ($/ton CO2) 100
Gasoline Carbon Intensity (gCO2/MJ) 100
Corn Ethanol Carbon Intensity (gCO2/MJ) 85
Cellulosic Ethanol Carbon Intensity (gCO2/MJ) 30
Baseline Fuel Price ($/gal) 2.835
Baseline Gasoline Production (bgal) 130
Baseline Corn Ethanol Production (bgal) 13
Baseline Cellulosic Ethanol Production (bgal) {0.5, 2}
Policy Parameters
LCFS Constraint (gCO2/MJ) [30,100]
RFS Constraint (%) [S0, 100]
Credit Window Price ($/gal) [0,5]
*Notes: S0 is the initial share of biofuel, which differs across the low and
high cellulosic scenario.
fuel mandates phase in over time and do not reach steady state mandate levels for a decade or more. Given
the static nature of the model, we seek to capture the medium- to long-run efficient policies and thus choose
mid-range supply elasticities to reflect this. The supply elasticity and initialized values of cellulosic ethanol
production are set to reflect two scenarios, one in which cellulosic ethanol is more readily available with a
higher supply elasticity and another with small initial production and in which supply is relatively capacity
constrained. In the former, we set the initial production of cellulosic ethanol at 2 bgals with an elasticity of
3. In the latter, we assume initial production is 0.5 bgals with an elasticity of 0.5.
We assume carbon damages are $100/ton CO2e. The most recent estimates of the average social cost
of carbon issued by the Interagency Working Group on the Social Cost of Carbon based on a 3% discount
rate is around $45/ton CO2; however, estimates based on the same discount rate range from nearly zero to
over $130/ton CO2 (IAWG, 2013). We choose a relatively higher value to illustrate the qualitative features
of optimal mandates better under various scenarios. Results are qualitatively the same for lower values;
however, optimal mandate levels are less stringent. The carbon intensity values of each fuel are set to be
similar to those used by the California Air Resources Board (ARB), with gasoline, corn ethanol, and cellulosic
ethanol CIs set to 100, 85, and 30 gCO2/MJ, respectively (California ARB, 2015).
The policy constraints are equivalent to those used in Section 3, with the exception that they include
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cellulosic ethanol. The constraints are given by:
[RFS:] qETH + qCEL − αqGAS ≥ 0
[LCFS:] (σ − φGAS)qGAS + (σ − φETH)qETH + (σ − φCEL)qCEL ≥ 0,
where α is the RFS constraint, σ is the LCFS constraint, ‘GAS’ denotes gasoline, ‘ETH’ denotes corn ethanol,
and ‘CEL’ denotes cellulosic ethanol. We normalize the LCFS constraint so that the carbon intensity of
fuel in the no policy equilibrium equals 1. Thus, (1 − σ) ∗ 100 represents the percentage reduction in the
carbon intensity of fuels relative to the baseline carbon intensity required by the policy. In addition, the
Lagrange Multiplier on the policy constraint is denominated in $/gal under the normalization, allowing for
easy comparison with the RFS shadow value.
From our discussion above, we know setting σ equal to zero and the credit price equal to marginal
damages will achieve the first-best outcome. Given that such a policy is infeasible politically, we constrain
both fuel mandates to be ‘technologically’ feasible. Specifically, we allow the RFS to range from the initial
share of biofuel, S0 in Table 1, to 100%. We allow the LCFS constraint to range from the 1 to the carbon
intensity of cellulosic ethanol. Thus, the most stringent the LCFS can be set is to require that all fuel be
cellulosic ethanol.
Whenever compliance credits are available, the policy constraints are given by:
[RFS:] qETH + qCEL + c− αqGAS ≥ 0
[LCFS:] (σ − φGAS)qGAS + (σ − φETH)qETH + (σ − φCEL)qCEL + c ≥ 0.
The credit window price ranges from free to $5/gal.
4.1 Second-best fuel mandates
We solve for market clearing prices and quantities under all policy and cost containment combinations
to compare welfare outcomes across the various scenarios. We solve for the second-best policies using a
grid search over the policy parameters to find the welfare maximizing level. For the policies with a cost
containment mechanism, we search over both the policy parameter and the level of the cost containment
mechanism. Table 2 summarizes the optimal policies under both the high and low cellulosic scenarios. Recall
that all policies are second-best by nature. Therefore, the difference between the social welfare under each
of the policies and the welfare under the first-best scenario is equal to the deadweight loss (DWL) of the
policy.
In both the low and high cellulosic scenarios, the largest DWL occurs under ‘business as usual’ (BAU),
which corresponds to the 2010 no policy equilibrium. An optimally set RFS leads to small welfare gains over
BAU, on the order of $200 ($420) million/year in the low (high) cellulosic ethanol scenario. Similarly, an
optimally set LCFS decreases DWL relative to BAU by $190 ($660) million/year in the low (high) cellulosic
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Table 2: Optimal Second-Best Policies and Social Welfare Outcomes Relative to the First-Best*
Low Cellulosic Scenario
Policy Optimal Level DWL ($ bil)
BAU $5.81
RFS Mandated Share 12.78% $5.63
RFS w/ Credit Window Mandated Share 100% $4.56
Credit Price $0.18/gal
LCFS Mandated Reductions 0.90% $5.62
LCFS w/ Credit Window Mandated Reductions 78.69% $0.16
Credit Price $1.35/gal
High Cellulosic Scenario
Policy Optimal Level DWL ($ bil)
BAU $6.32
RFS Mandated Share 15.64% $5.90
RFS w/ Credit Window Mandated Share 100% $4.71
Credit Price $0.19/gal
LCFS Mandated Reductions 2.10% $5.66
LCFS w/ Credit Window Mandated Reductions 78.69% $0.24
Credit Price $1.35/gal
*Notes: BAU is ‘business as usual’ and corresponds to the 2010 no policy equilibrium. The LCFS is specified
as percentage reduction from the 2010 baseline carbon intensity. The RFS is specified as the percentage biofuel
mandated. DWL is ‘deadweight loss’ and represents the social welfare loss relative to the first-best outcome.
scenario. In all scenarios, fuel mandates with no cost containment mechanism have a DWL exceeding $5
billion/year relative to the first best allocation.
The largest welfare gains occur when policies are paired optimally with a credit window, particularly for
the LCFS. In both scenarios and for both policies, it is optimal to set the policies at their most stringent
feasible level and offer compliance credits at a low price. Consistent with the results of our theory model, the
optimal credit window price is set such that the implicit tax on gasoline is less than marginal damages. In
particular, given the simulation parameters, marginal damages from gasoline are approximately $1.20/gal.
Under the high cellulosic scenario, the optimal implicit gasoline tax is approximately $0.19/gal and $1.12/gal
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Table 3: High Cellulosic Relative Market Outcomes*
Outcomes BAU RFS RFS
Credit
LCFS LCFS
Credit
Fuel Price ($/gal) -$1.11 -$1.11 -$0.97 -$1.10 -$0.15
Consumer Surplus (bil $) $150.45 $149.81 $86.56 $149.43 $19.65
Quantities (bgals)
Fuel 8.10 8.20 7.32 8.27 0.76
Gasoline 11.29 7.96 4.69 7.23 -0.95
Corn Ethanol -1.35 2.82 5.32 2.99 2.13
Cellulosic Ethanol -2.05 -1.41 -1.03 -0.55 0.75
Emissions (MMT) 120.59 111.30 90.39 105.86 5.24
*Notes: BAU is ‘business as usual’ and corresponds to the 2010 no policy equilibrium. MMT is
‘million metric tons’. All variables are in levels relative to the corresponding first-best outcome.
for the RFS and the LCFS, respectively. The optimal LCFS with a credit window reduces DWL to $160
- $240 million/year. Thus, while the LCFS and RFS have similar welfare effects in all other scenarios, an
LCFS nearly eliminates DWL when it is paired with an optimal credit window while the RFS with an optimal
credit window has a DWL over $4.5 bil/year.
4.2 Market effects of fuel mandates
Table 3 compares key market outcomes relative to their corresponding first-best outcomes for the high
cellulosic scenario.17 Every policy except the LCFS with a credit window has significantly lower fuel prices
(≈$1.10/gal lower) and higher consumer surplus than the first-best. The results illustrate a key feature of
fuel mandates: by inducing transfers between firms rather than taxing all emissions, the policies have a much
smaller price impact than a first-best policy.
Total fuel consumption is higher than the first-best equilibrium across all scenarios. The composition of
fuel, however, varies substantially. For the policies that more closely mirror a tax on gasoline (the RFS with
credit window, and LCFS with credit window) gasoline supply is close to the first-best allocation. Because
both policies continue to either under-tax or subsidize renewable fuel, however, they have higher total ethanol
supply than the first-best.
Gasoline producers have the highest production under BAU. Corn ethanol producers have the highest
production under the optimal RFS with a credit window, and cellulosic producers have the highest production
17Results for the low cellulosic scenario are similar and available upon request.
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Figure 2: Deadweight Loss of Fuel Mandates
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under the optimal LCFS with a credit window. Emissions under BAU are 8% higher than under the first-best
policy. While all policies reduce emissions relative to BAU, most reductions are modest. A second-best RFS
reduces emissions the least, with emissions decreasing only 0.5% from BAU. An optimal RFS with a credit
window reduces emissions the second most. The largest emission reductions occur under an optimal LCFS
with a credit window. In this case, emissions are only slightly higher than first-best emissions despite having
quite a different fuel mix.
4.3 Efficiency gains from cost containment mechanisms
The previous sections compare the relative efficiency of the policies when all parameters are set optimally.
In this section we study when, for given policy, instituting a cost containment mechanism leads to efficiency
gains in the spirit of the analytical results derived in Section 3.4.
For reference, Figure 2 graphs the DWL in billion dollars on the y-axes against varying levels of the RFS
and LCFS on the x-axes. The bold horizontal line corresponds to the DWL under BAU. Thus, whenever
the DWL under an RFS or LCFS is higher than the DWL under BAU, the regulator would be better served
by having no policy. The optimal policies correspond to around a 15% RFS or an LCFS that requires just
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Figure 3: Deadweight Loss of Fuel Mandates with a Credit Window
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over a 2% CI reduction.18 DWL from the policies exceed BAU levels if the RFS mandate is higher than
20% or the LCFS requires more than a 5% average CI reduction. Losses increase sharply beyond these levels
and exceed $10 bil/year as the RFS exceeds a 30% biofuel mandate or the LCFS requires more than a 8%
average CI reduction.
Now consider a scenario with a fixed policy stringency where the regulator can offer a credit window.
Figure 3 graphs DWL on the y-axes and the price of either the RFS or LCFS compliance credit window on
the x-axes for three RFS and LCFS levels. As before, the bold horizontal line corresponds to business as
usual DWL. Note that when credit window prices are $0/gal, the policy is non-binding as parties collect free
compliance credits. Thus, when credits are free, each policy has the same DWL as BAU.
Consider the RFS in the left graph of Figure 3. The dotted line corresponds to the second-best RFS with
no cost containment provision (≈ 15%), the dashed line corresponds to a more stringent biofuel mandate
(50%), and the line with diamonds corresponds to the second-best RFS with credit window, a 100% mandate.
For a 15% mandate, the DWL is unchanged whenever the credit window price is greater than $0.10/gal
because credit window prices are so high that the window is non-binding and firms comply with the policy
18Recall that the BAU average CI is 1 in our model. Thus the second best LCFS of σ = 0.98 corresponds to a policy
requiring a (1− 0.98)× 100 % average CI reduction.
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instead of purchasing credits from the window. In this case, losses are minimized when the credit window
price is high and firms comply with the policy. Thus, at low levels of the RFS, adding a credit window to
an RFS does not increase welfare above BAU.
A credit window leads to larger efficiency gains when mandates are stringent. A 50% RFS with no cost
containment mechanisms leads to a DWL exceeding $10 bil/year (Figure 2). With a credit window offering,
setting the credit window price optimally reduces DWL to ≈ $5 bil/year, lower than BAU losses. The
optimal RFS-credit window corresponds to a 100% biofuel mandate and a credit window price of $0.19/gal.
Optimally setting both the RFS and credit window price reduces DWL to around $4.7 bil/year.
The right graph presents similar results for three LCFS mandates. The dotted line corresponds to the
second-best LCFS with a 2.10% CI reduction; the dashed lines correspond to an LCFS requiring a 50% CI
reduction; and the line with diamonds corresponds to an LCFS requiring a 78.69% CI reduction. When the
policy is set at low levels, the credit window does not lead to efficiency gains. Under a stringent LCFS,
however, setting credit window prices at $1.35/gal leads to large efficiency gains. For a 10% CI reduction,
an optimal credit window choice can reduce DWL to $2 bil/year, while setting the most stringent LCFS in
combination with an optimally set credit window price nearly eliminates the DWL.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Renewable energy mandates such as the RFS and LCFS are increasingly popular tools for policymakers
seeking to reduce carbon emissions in the energy sector. Because most renewable energy mandates rely on
advances in new technologies, a binding mandate may lead to situations with exceedingly high short-run
compliance costs. As a result, cost containment provisions can play an important role in preventing short-run
increases in compliance costs.
In this paper, we show that cost containment mechanisms can substantially increase the efficiency of
renewable fuel mandates even in the absence of uncertain compliance costs. We show that there may be
substantial welfare gains to setting a stringent policy with a low cap on compliance costs by establishing a
compliance credit window. When both the fuel mandate and the credit window price are set optimally, the
second-best policy and credit window price can substantially reduce deadweight loss from the externality,
and nearly eliminates deadweight loss under an LCFS with a credit window. Importantly, we show that the
efficiency of an RFS is limited by its inability to differentiate fuels based on their relative emission intensities.
The success of an intervention in compliance credit markets depends on the existence of a liquid market
for credits. While the RIN credit market has been fairly developed since 2009, recent price spikes in 2013 have
caused some participants to question whether the market has behaved efficiently. In addition, California’s
LCFS credit market has been characterized by low trade volumes and large swings in the value of the credits.
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If compliance credit markets have high transactions costs or poor price discovery, the results discussed here
are not applicable. Further exploration of these issues, both analytically and empirically, would be beneficial
to understanding the efficiency of these policies.
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A Proofs
• Proof of Proposition 1:
Taking the total differential of equations (1), (2) and the policy constraint yields:
∂P
∂Q − ∂
2Cc
∂qc∂qc
∂P
∂Q
∂ϕ(·)
∂qc
∂P
∂Q
∂P
∂Q − ∂
2Cr
∂qr∂qr
∂ϕ(·)
∂qr
∂ϕ(·)
∂qc
∂ϕ(·)
∂qr 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=H

dqc
dqr
dλ
 =

−λ∂2ϕ(·)∂qc∂θ
−λ∂2ϕ(·)∂qr∂θ
−∂ϕ(·)∂θ

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=h
dθ.
Let ηd denote the price elasticity of demand for fuel and ξi denote the price elasticity of supply for
i = c, r. Substituting ∂P∂Q =
1
ηd
P
Q , and
∂2Ci
∂qi∂qi =
1
ξi
P
qi for i = c, r:
1
ηd
P
Q − 1ξc Pqc 1ηd PQ ∂ϕ(·)∂qc
1
ηd
P
Q
1
ηd
P
Q − 1ξr Pqr ∂ϕ(·)∂qr
∂ϕ(·)
∂qc
∂ϕ(·)
∂qr 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=H

dqc
dqr
dλ
 =

−λ∂2ϕ(·)∂qc∂θ
−λ∂2ϕ(·)∂qr∂θ
−∂ϕ(·)∂θ

︸ ︷︷ ︸
=h
dθ.
The matrix H is the bordered Hessian and is negative semi-definite by concavity of the objective
function. We can solve for dxdθ for x ∈ {qc, qr} using Cramer’s rule:
dx
dθ
=
det(Hi)
det(H)
,
where H is the bordered Hessian and Hi(·) is the matrix H with the ith column replaced with col-
umn h. Note that det(H) > 0 for both policies.19 Thus, the signs of the effects are determined by
sign
(
det(Hi)
)
.
Solving for the RFS yields:
dqc
dα
=
(
P
ηd
− P
ξr
− λ
)
det(H)−1 < 0
dqr
dα
=
(
P
ξc
− P
ηd
− αλ
)
det(H)−1.
Considering the price effect:
dP
dα
=
∂P
∂Q
(
dqc
dα
+
dqr
dα
)
=
1
ηd
P
Q
dQ
dα
.
Solving for the LCFS yields:
dqc
dσ
=
(
(φc − φr)
(
P
ξr
− P
ηd
)
+ (σ − φr)(φc − φr)λ
)
det(H)−1 > 0
dqr
dσ
=
(
(φc − φr)
(
P
ηd
− P
ξc
)
+ (φc − σ)(φc − φr)λ
)
det(H)−1.
19To confirm this, note that det(H) = 1
ξc
P
qc
− 1
ηd
P
Q
+ α2
(
1
ξr
P
qr
− 1
ηd
P
Q
)
− 2α 1
ηd
P
Q
> 0 for the RFS and det(H) =
(σ − φc)2
(
1
ξr
P
qr
− 1
ηd
P
Q
)
+ (σ − φr)2
(
1
ξc
P
qc
− 1
ηd
P
Q
)
+ 2(σ − φc)(σ − φr) 1
ηd
P
Q
> 0 for the LCFS.
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with fuel price effects:
dP
dσ
=
1
ηd
P
Q
dQ
dσ
.
• Proof of Proposition 2:
Taking the total differential of equations (1), (2), and the policy constraint yields:
1
ηd
P
Q − 1ξc Pqc 1ηd PQ 0
1
ηd
P
Q
1
ηd
P
Q − 1ξr Pqr 0
∂ϕ(·)
∂qc
∂ϕ(·)
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dqr
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=h
dp¯cred.
We can derive the comparative statics using Cramer’s rule. For the RFS, this yields:
dqc
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+ α
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Next consider the LCFS:
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B Fuel Mandates as Second-Best Policies
In this section, we consider a graphical analysis of the second-best nature of fuel mandates. The analysis is
similar to that presented in Helfand (1992). Figure B.1 illustrates the inefficiency of the mandates graphically.
The solid circles are iso-welfare curves that exclude pollution damages. The dashed circles are iso-welfare
curves when pollution externalities are internalized.20 In the absence of any policy, the competitive market
maximizes consumer and producer surplus at point A, which differs from the social optimum, point B.
To align the competitive and first-best outcome, a regulator can either tax emissions or institute a cap
and trade program, illustrated in Figure B.1(a). Iso-emissions curves are the parallel downward-sloping lines
and have slope (−φc/φr). The dashed downward-sloping line corresponds to emissions under the no policy
outcome. If the government institutes a cap and trade program setting the cap at the first-best emission
level, represented by the solid downward-sloping line, the competitive market outcome will correspond to
the social optimum.
Now consider the efficiency of fuel mandates, illustrated in Figure B.1(b). We represent both policies as
rays from the origin, where the slope of the ray corresponding to the share of renewable fuel required by
the policy. A binding share mandate must pass to the left of the initial share of renewable fuels given by
the dashed ray passing through point A. Consider the effect of a binding mandate given by the solid ray.
Under the fuel mandate, firms maximize profits at C, resulting in higher renewable and conventional fuel
production and higher emissions than the efficient outcome B.
To illustrate that fuel mandates cannot achieve the first-best outcome, suppose the regulator knows the
share of renewable fuels or the carbon intensity of fuels under the first-best outcome and sets the mandate
at this level, represented by the dotted line through point B. Despite being set at the optimal share, the
market maximizes profits at D, away from the first-best outcome. This is due to the subsidy the policies
provide for renewable fuel, which reduces the price impact of the policy.
More formally, with a cap and trade permit system, the first-order conditions for an interior solution are:
P − ∂C
i
∂qi
= τφi
for i = c, r, where τ is the permit price.
We can say that, for each fuel i = c, r, P − ∂Ci∂qi the marginal abatement cost per unit of output, while
the marginal abatement cost MACi per unit of emissions is:
MACi =
(
P − ∂C
i
∂qi
)
/φi (6)
20Specifically, the solid circles represent level curves of the function U(Q)−Cc(qc)−Cr(qr), and the dashed circles represent
level curves of the function U(Q)− Cc(qc)− Cr(qr)−D(qc, qr).
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for i = c, r.
In a cap and trade permit system, the marginal abatement cost MACi per unit of emissions given by
equation (6) equals the permit price τ for each fuel i = c, r. As a consequence, it is possible for a cap and
trade permit system to achieve first-best. In particular, a cap and trade permit system is first-best when
the permit price is equal to marginal damages: τ = D′(·).
However, for fuel mandates, the marginal abatement cost MACi per unit of emissions does not equal the
permit price. Formally, for fuel mandates, the analogous first-order conditions are:
[qc :] P − ∂Cc∂qc = λα (7)
[qr :] P − ∂Cr∂qr = −λ (8)
for the RFS, and:
[qc :] P − ∂Cc∂qc = λ (φc − σ) (9)
[qr :] P − ∂Cr∂qr = −λ (σ − φr) (10)
for the LCFS.
Once again we can say that, for each fuel i = c, r, P − ∂Ci∂qi gives the marginal abatement cost per unit of
output, while the marginal abatement cost MACi per unit of emissions is given by equation (6). However,
the fuel mandate permit price does not equal the marginal abatement cost per unit of emissions. Instead,
from the first-order conditions in equations (7) and (8), the RFS permit price equals the following:
[qc :] P − ∂Cc∂qc /α = λ (11)
[qr :] −
(
P − ∂Cr∂qr
)
= λ. (12)
Likewise, from the first-order conditions in equations (9) and (10), the LCFS permit price equals the
following:
[qc :]
(
P − ∂Cc∂qc
)
/ (φc − σ) = λ (13)
[qr :] −
(
P − ∂Cr∂qr
)
/ (σ − φr) = λ. (14)
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Substituting in the marginal abatement cost MACi per unit of emissions given by equation (6) into
equations (11)-(14) for the fuel mandate permit price, we get:
[qc :] MACcφc/α = λ (15)
[qr :] −MACrφr = λ (16)
for the RFS, and:
[qc :] MACcφc/ (φc − σ) = λ (17)
[qr :] −MACrφr/ (σ − φr) = λ. (18)
for the LCFS, or, equivalently:
[qc :] MACc = λα/φc (19)
[qr :] MACr = −λ/φr (20)
for the RFS, and:
[qc :] MACc = λ (φc − σ) /φc (21)
[qr :] MACr = −λ (σ − φr) /φr. (22)
for the LCFS.
Thus, in contrast to a cap and trade program, for fuel mandates, the marginal abatement cost MACi per
unit of emissions does not equal the permit price. As a consequence, mandates cannot achieve the first-best.
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Figure B.1: First-best, competitive outcome, and fuel mandates
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*Notes: Solid circles are iso-welfare curves less damages and the dotted circles are iso-social welfare curves. The parallel
downward-sloping lines in (a) are iso-emission lines with slope (−φc/φr). The rays from the origin in (b) represent fuel
mandates.
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